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Introduction 
Kluge (1993) criticized the three-taxon approach (of Nelson and Platnick, 1991; 
hereinafter 3ta), while Platnick (1993) viewed those criticisms as largely misplaced, 
but each author considered his position consistent with Farris’ (1983) discussion 
of the relationship between parsimony and explanatory power. In that latter 
regard the disagreement would appear to result from overlooking some aspects of 
Farris’ treatment, and our purpose here is to show how this misunderstanding can 
be resolved. 
Parsimony 
Platnick (1993: 271) put the matter succinctly. 
“Farris [ (1983)] showed that those cladograms which imply fewer steps are to be preferred on 
grounds of their ability to summarize, describe, and explain the data. Do similar arguments jut 
tify the three-taxon approach?“. 
Fewer steps, that is, according to the standard approach, as Platnick called it. On 
the same page he concluded, 
“The two approaches both use parsimony, and rely on the same type ofjustification for that use.” 
By parsimony he meant that each method minimizes extra steps of some kind, but 
that analogy need not mean that both are covered by the same justification. To 
show where differences may arise, we begin by summarizing Farris’ (1983) 
discussion. 
The connection between extra steps and explanatory power has several parts. 
There is first the matter of what is explained (Farris, 1983: 18). 
“Genealogies provide only a single kind of explanation. A genealogy does not explain by itself 
why one group acquires a new feature while its sister group retains the ancestral trait. . . A gen- 
ealogy is able to explain obsenred points of similarity among organisms just when it can account 
for them as identical by virtue of inheritance from a common ancestor.“. 
Similarities not so explained might be produced by mistakes in observation or 
coding, possibilities that can be evaluated by checking the data. Similarities still 
unexplained after such checking must be attributed ad hoc to homoplasy. But a 
theory loses explanatory power when an ad hoc hypothesis must be introduced (cf. 
Farris, 1983: 17ff). 
Requirements for ad hoc hypotheses are then to be minimized, but the counting 
must be done carefully (Farris, 1983: 19). 
“It is thus important to ensure that the homoplasies combined in such totals are logically inde- 
pendent, since otherwise their number need not reflect required ad hoc hypotheses.“. 
Explanatory power is reduced when a new ad hoc hypothesis is required, but not 
when all or part of an old one is repeated. 
This means, for example, that (as is well known) logically interdependent 
characters should not be used as if they comprised separate evidence. Another 
source of dependence will be particularly pertinent here (Farris, 1983: 20). 
“Suppose that a putative genealogy distributes [the 20 terminals showing feature X] into two 
distantly related groups A and B of 10 terminals each. There are 100 distinct two-taxon compari- 
sons of members of A with members of B, and each of those similarities in X considered in iso- 
lation comprises a homoplasy. Those homoplasies do not constitute independent required 
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hypotheses, however. The genealogy . . . is consistent with identity by descent of X within each 
group. If X is identical by descent in any two members of A, and also in any two members of B, 
then the A-B similarities are all homoplasies if any one of them is. The genealogy thus requires 
but a single ad hoc hypothesis of homoplasy. Of course the numbers in the groups do not mat- 
ter; the same conclusion would follow if they were 15 and 5, or 19 and 1.“. 
Despite the apparent complexity of such cases, the problem of counting hypoth- 
eses turns out to have a simple solution (Farris, 1983: 20). 
“A hypothesis of homoplasy logically independent of others is required precisely when a gen- 
ealogy requires an additional origin of a feature.“. 
In standard parsimony each extra step corresponds to an additional origin of 
feature, and this leads at last to the main result. The number of independent ud 
hoc hypotheses of homoplasy required by a genealogy increases with the number of 
extra steps. Ability to explain observed similarities thus decreases as extra steps 
increase. 
Dependence 
That finding, however, pertains to extra steps as calculated in the standard 
method. The extra steps in 3ta do not generally correspond in number to origins 
of features; rather they count discarded three-taxon statements, those not con- 
forming to the considered tree. To arrive at his conclusion, that 3ta is justified in 
the same way as standard parsimony, Platnick equated discarded statements with 
ad hoc hypotheses. But this disregards possible dependence among those 
statements. 
The effect seen in Farris’ 1983 example can become more pronounced in 3ta. 
Three-taxon statements include two-taxon similarities, and their number is further 
compounded by choices of the third taxon. This is seen in Fig. 1, where 20 ter- 
minals have apomorphic state 1 of a character, 12 others showing plesiomorphic 






























Fig. 1. Two cases illustrating dependence among three-taxon statements. For explanation see text. 
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single hypothesis of homoplasy is required. But 1200 three-&axon statements are 
discarded. 
Counting discarded three-taxon statements usually amounts to counting each 
independent hypothesis of homoplasy several times, but simple inflation is not the 
greatest difficulty. Worse is that the degree of redundancy is not uniform, so that 
the two counts need not be well correlated. 
The algebraic basis for Case 1 is that the number of discarded three-taxon state- 
ments is proportional to the product of the sizes (numbers of included terminals) 
of the groups into which the apomorphic state is divided. Because that product 
becomes relatively smaller when the groups are of unequal size, dependence 
among statements can produce results like that seen in Case 2. There group C con- 
sists of 15 of the Is, each of the other five being placed on a separate branch of the 
tree. 
Compared to Case 1, explanatory power is now decreased: the number of stan- 
dard extra steps-of independent hypotheses of homoplasy required-increases to 
five. But the number of discarded three-taxon statements decreases to 1020. Coun- 
ting each discarded statement as an ad hoc hypothesis can lead to the wrong con- 
clusion when explanatory ability is to be compared between different trees. 
Platnick (1993) did not discuss dependence, but others have addressed related 
subjects. Under “Character Dependence and Redundancy” Nelson (1993: 264) 
suggested, 
“Each of A(DE), B(DE), and C(DE) is a statement of homology (relationship) relative to a diff- 
erent taxon (A, B, or C). The statements are separate evidence because each one, or pair, or all 
three might fit a particular tree, and the remainder, if any, might not.“. 
That kind of separateness is not sufficient for independence of ad hoc hypoth- 
eses. Say that terminals a and b belong respectively to groups A and B of Fig. 1. 
Statements s( ab) , x( ab) and y( ab) (as well as others) are separate in Nelson’s sense. 
But all are discarded by the tree of Case 1, although only a single hypothesis of 
homoplasy is required. 
Nelson’s reasoning, in fact, would even make pairwise similarities “separate evi- 
dence”. Various trees could fit one, two, or all three of the two-taxon similarities 
XD, YD and ZD. But a tree might discard all three, yet require just one hypothesis 
of homoplasy. This could occur if X, Y and Z were grouped together while separ- 
ated from D. 
Dependence among ud hoc hypotheses is not identical to dependence among 
observations, since separate observations may be covered by a single ad hoc hypoth- 
esis. The two kinds of dependence are nonetheless connected. If “separate” 
characters are interdependent, “separate” ad hoc hypotheses covering them will 
generally be interdependent as well. 
Nelson and Ladiges (1992) knew that three-taxon statements can be interdepen- 
dent, and they proposed to take this into account by assigning a fractional weight 
to each statement. The weight is the ratio p/q between (q), the number of state- 
ments derivable from some particular standard character, and (p), the number of 
such statements taken to be independent. 
That technique may affect the relative weights of statements from different stan- 
dard characters, but any two statements from the same character always have the 
same weight. The weighting would thus have no effect on the outcome of the pre- 
ceding example, since only one standard character is involved. Although 
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employing information on dependence, this method cannot undo the deleterious 
effects of dependence. 
Stems 
Another difficulty is touched on by Platnick’s (1993: 271) “only”. 
‘A cladogram can only explain the homology statement expressed in a tree-taxon statement by 
common cause (ancestry) if that tree-taxon statement can be accommodated at one of its 
nodes.” 
In trying to assess explanation, 3ta counts every accommodated (undiscarded) 
statement, in effect proceeding as if “only” meant “always”, and this can lead to 
contradictions. 
To see this, first observe that, while Platnick mentioned just one homology, a 
three-taxon statement actually makes a further claim. According to statement 
H(lJ), I and J h s are an apomorphy, while H shows the plesiomorphy. To explain 
that statement, a tree must account for both parts as the result of inheritance. The 
apomorphic similarity between I and J cannot be attributed to parallelism, but 
neither can the plesiomorphy of H be attributed to reversal. 
A convenient illustration is provided by Platnick’s (1993: his Fig. 1) examples, 
reproduced in Fig. 2. There six terminals a. .f show apomorphic state 1 of the 
character, nine others r. .z having plesiomorphic state 0, for a total of 135 three- 
taxon statements. State 0 is presumed present at the root of all three trees. 
That both apomorphies and plesiomorphies must be accounted for at once is 
seen in Tree 4, which (as Platnick pointed out) discards all 135 statements. For 
r( a@, for example, Tree 4 is consistent with a single origin of either state, but not 
with single origins for both. If the 1s shared by a and b are not parallel, the 0 of r 
must be a reversal. If that 0 is not a reversal, the 1s must be parallel. 
When a tree does explain a three-taxon statement, the same requirements deter- 
mine the condition of stem species. This is seen in Tree 3, which accommodates 
r( ab). If a and b share 1s because of inheritance, their most recent common 
ancestor-which is the stem of (a. .c)-must have state 1. If the 0 of ris not rever- 
sal, each ancestor of r must have state 0. This establishes the state in the stems of 
(r. .z), of (d. .z) and of (a. .z). 
The difficulty arises when requirements from different statements conflict. Tree 
1 accommodates r(uJ) and x( ef) , but it cannot explain both at once. Explaining the 
shared 1s of a and f by inheritance demands that all 11 stems between a and fhave 
state 1. But to account for the 0 of x, every ancestor of z-including eight of those 
same stems-must have state 0 instead. 
Other pairs of statements show similar contradictions. It is easily found that 
while Tree 1 seems to accommodate 65 of the statements, it can account for at 
most 45 of them together. They are those obtained by combining any one of r, s, t 
with any two 1s. 
Platnick meant his examples to illustrate differences between the two methods. 
Tree 1 requires five standard extra steps and discards 70 (accommodates 65) 
statements. Tree 3 requires only one standard extra step, but discards 81 
(accommodates 54) statements. Tree 3 would be preferred by standard parsimony, 
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Fig. 2. Three examples after Platnick (1993: his Fig. 1). For explanation see text. 
whereas-he supposed-Tree 1 would provide the better explanation of three- 
taxon statements. 
Similar discrepancies can be produced when 3ta is misled by redundancy, as 
seen before. But redundancy aside for the moment, the statement counts 
employed in 3ta do not provide a reliable indication of relative explanatory power. 
While Tree 1 seems to fit 65 statements, it can explain only 45 of them. Tree 3 con- 
forms to just 54 statements, but it can explain them all’. Tree 3 should then be pre- 
ferred, and the improved assessment agrees in this case with the redundancy-free 
evaluation provided by standard parsimony. 
Programs for parsimony analysis reconstruct the states of stem species by optim- 
ization procedures (cf. Farris, 1970), and applying optimization to three-taxon 
statements has proved controversial (Platnick, 1993: 267). 
‘Using a standard parsimony program to optimize them is simply a misuse of the program.“. 
For this reason it is important to note that the present discussion does not rely 
‘Assign state 1 to the stems of (R .r) and (d. ./), state 0 to all other stems. 
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on standard optimization. The conditions attributed here to stem species are just 
those that follow logically from the premise that a three-taxon statement is 
explained by inheritance and common ancestry. The point of making those deduc- 
tions is simply to show that explanations of accommodated statements may be 
mutually exclusive, which is to say that what 3ta counts does not measure 
explanation. 
This difficulty arises because the three-taxon statements involve the same charac- 
ter. If r(a.. and x(ef) instead described independent binary variables, the contra- 
diction would vanish. While this drawback of 3ta seems superficially different from 
the redundancy problem seen earlier, the two thus have a common cause. Three- 
taxon statements concerning the same features are interrelated, but Nelson 
(quoted above) took them as separate evidence, and 3ta treats them accordingly. 
Plan-rick (1993: 271) saw no difficulty in the 3ta evaluation, but felt instead that 
3ta might properly give results different from those of standard parsimony. This is 
because: 
“[The two methods] differ with regard to what it is they are trying to explain: minimally [in stan- 
dard parsimony], a raw observation that one taxon has one feature, or [in 3ta] a hypothesis that 
only two out of three taxa share a homologous feature.“. 
And (p. 271), 
‘The notion that systematic data constitute a normal character x taxon matrix is not an intrin- 
sically cladistic notion; indeed, that type of matrix seems to have originated with pheneticists. 
Consider an alternative view, that the three-taxon matrix instead constitutes systematic data.“. 
The origin of that conception of what the standard method explains is a com- 
plete myste$‘, but the general sense of the argument seems clear. The relative 
merits of trees may reasonably change when the evidence is written in a different 
notation. Nelson (1993: 261) expressed a similar view. 
“[Kluge (1993)] assumes.. . that a matrix of binary characters (his matrix 1) is original data and 
that the corresponding three-item matrix (his matrix 2) is transformation. Why not assume the 
opposite and justify other conclusions?“. 
Justify 3ta, he meant’. As to why to assume the opposite (p. 261): 
“Empirical data originate in obsenation. Do data originate there as binary characters or as three- 
item statements?. . . When and how do [mammary glands] originate in human understanding as 
a binary character, or as one or more three-item statement, rather than a source of milk to a 
young and hungry mouth?“. 
All this was intended to suggest that three-taxon statements may somehow be the 
units to count in assessing explanatory power. But even if that premise were 
accepted, the three-taxon approach would still give the wrong counts. In the last 
example, the relative explanatory power of trees is misjudged precisely because the 
statements that 3ta counts as accommodated cannot all be explained. 
‘1As is the reason for Platnick’s theory on tire history of data matrices. Pheneticists had simply adopted 
the sort of matrix long employed in multivariate statistics. 
‘Kluge’s (1993) use of “original” and “transformed” followed Nelson and Platnick’s (1991). 
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Not that these comments actually provide any support for that premise. Fascinat- 
ing thought it is, Nelson’s theory of human perception is completely irrelevant. 
The issue is not how we notice that mammals share mammary glands, or how we 
formulate that discovery, but rather just how shared features bear on phylogenetic 
inferences. 
While he avoided psychology, Platnick followed Nelson in regarding evaluation 
as a matter of notation and, in so doing, he missed one of the main points of 
Farris’ (1983) treatment. The counts used in standard parsimony are not chosen 
because the data are written as a standard matrix, but because they reflect the 
number of independent ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy. It is that independence 
that is crucial to assessing explanatory power. The fault of the three-taxon 
approach is simply that it treats as independent, quantities that are in fact 
interrelated. 
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